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GOVERNMENT DRUG TESTING IN MARYLAND: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF CITY OF ANNAPOLIS v. UNITED
FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS, LOCAL 400
Ellen Zelinski Cohillt

Drug abuse has reached epidemic proportions in American society, I affecting the workplace in several ways. First, employees who
are drug abusers jeopardize the safety of their co-workers and the
general public; those using drugs have three to four times as many
accidents as other employees. 2 Second, employees who use drugs have
a "higher rate of absenteeism, with estimates ranging from 2.5 to
t B.S., magna cum laude, 1981, Towson State University; M.A.S., 1986, Johns
Hopkins University; J.D., 1992, University of Baltimore School of Law;
Attorney, Maryland Department of Human Resources, Child Care Administration, Baltimore, Maryland.
1. Michael R. O'Donnell, Comment, Employee Drug Testing-Balancing the
Interests in the Workplace: A Reasonable Suspicion Standard, 74 VA. L. REV.
969, 970 (1988) (citing Evan Thomas, America's Crusade: What is Behind the
Latest War on Drugs, TIME, Sept. 15, 1986, at 60 ("opinion polls reveal that
drug abuse is now the nation's number one concern"»; see also Kaye M.
Sunderland & Coni S. Rathbone, Development in the Law, Jar Wars: Drug
Testing in the Workplace, 23 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 529, 529-35 (1987) (providing
a brief sketch of the magnitude of drug abuse and its societal costs).
"More than seventy million Americans have experimented with illegal
drugs, and twenty-three million currently use an illegal drug." James M.
Sokolowski, Government Drug Testing: A Question of Reasonableness, 43
VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1344 (1990) (citing MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL
SCREENING AND THE EMPLOYEE HEALTH COST CRISIS 95 (1989».
2. Craig Zwerling et ai., The Efficacy of Preemployment Drug Screening for
Marijuana and Cocaine in Predicting Employment Outcome, 264 JAMA 2639,
2643 (1990). Research indicates that
[d) rug users have been reported to be involved in 200070 to 300070
more industrial accidents, to sustain 400% more compensable injuries,
and to use 1,500% more sick leave . . . . [T]hose with marijuanapositive urine samples have 55 percent more industrial accidents, 85
percent more injuries, and a 78 percent increase in absenteeism.
Id.
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16 times higher than employees who do not use drugs."3 Third, drug
abusers are likely to cause insurance costs to escalate because of
increased accident claims. Finally, because of the illegal use of drugs
in the workplace, billions of dollars are lost in productivity and
absenteeism each year in the United States.4
In City of Annapolis v. United Food & Commercial Workers,
Local 400,5 the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered the constitutionality of the City of Annapolis' drug testing program of fire
fighters and police personnel during routine physical examinations. 6
Although some degree of individualized suspicion is normally required
for searches conducted in the absence of the Fourth Amendment's
warrant and probable cause requirements, the court of appeals held
that exceptions do exist. 7 Earlier the same year, the Supreme Court
in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab8 and Skinner
v.- Railway Labor Executives' Association 9 recognized that exceptions
to the individualized suspicion requirement exist. - In United Food,
the court of appeals recognized standards no more protective of
employee rights than had been established by the Supreme Court. 1O
This Article examines the current state of government drug
testing in Maryland. Part I explores the problem of drugs in the
government workplace and discusses the relevant federal law on
government drug testing programs. Part II analyzes the United Food
decision as it applies to mandatory government drug testing and its
ramifications on the reasonable suspicion requirement of the Fourth
Amendment in light of Von Raab and Skinner. Part III reviews the
current state of Maryland law regarding drug testing. Part IV details
the drug testing procedures implemented by the Secretary of Person-

3. Mark A. Rothstein, Drug Testing in the Workplace: The Challenge to Employment Relations and Employment Law, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 683, 688
(1987).
4. Sokolowski, supra note I, at 1344 n.6 (citing MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL
SCREENING AND THE EMPLOYEE HEALTH COST CRISIS 95, 96 (1989»; see Anne
M. Rector, Comment, Use and Abuse of Urinalysis Testing in the Workplace:
A Proposal for Federal Legislation Limiting Drug Screening, 35 EMORY L.J.
lOll, lOll (1986); see also Study: $50 Billion Wasted Annually from Abuse
of Drugs and Alcohol, 4 Employee ReI. Weekly (BNA) 1554 (1986) (citing a
study by the Comprehensive Care Corporation).
5. 317 Md. 544, 565 A.2d 672 (1989).
6. [d. at 545-46, 565 A.2d at 672-73.
7. [d. at 552, 565 A.2d at 676.
8. 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989).
9. 489 U.S. 602, 619-20 (1989).
10. United Food, 317 Md. at 563, 565 A.2d at 681. While the Supreme Court is
the final arbiter regarding protections embodied in the federal constitution,
states are free to interpret their own constitutions as being more, but not less,
protective of individual liberties than the Federal Constitution.
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nel and currently codified at COMAR 06.01.09. Part V examines the
impact of various judicial and executive branch decisions on Maryland law. Finally, the Article concludes that the reasonableness
balancing test established by the Supreme Court and adopted by the
Court of Appeals of Maryland has given government employers wide
latitude in implementing drug testing programs.
I.

BACKGROUND

In response to the enormous drug abuse problem in the United
States,1l in 1986, President Reagan issued an executive order mandating a "drug-free federal workplace."12 This wide-sweeping order
dictated that illegal drug use by federal employees, on-duty or offduty, is unacceptable, and directed executive agencies to implement
a program for random drug testing of employees in "sensitive positions."13 Other government employers concerned with the economic
reality of drug abuse and safety in the workplace also responded by
implementing employee drug testing programs. 14 State and local government workers from groups as diverse as fire fighters and police
11. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
12. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301
(1988); see also Edward S. Adams, Random Drug Testing of Government
Employees: A Constitutional Procedure, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1335, 1335 n.3
(1987) (listing early military and administrative agency drug testing policies);
Thomas L. McGovern, III, Employee Drug-Testing Legislation: Redrawing the
Battlelines in the War on Drugs, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1453, 1460 (1987) (recognizing that the first challenges to urinalysis testing concerned the Army's Drug
and Alcohol Abuse Prevention and Control Program).
13. Exec. Order No. 12,564, supra note 12, § 3(a) reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301
(1988). Section 7(d) of the Order defines an "employee in a sensitive position"
as any of the following:
(1) An employee in a position that an agency head designates Special
Sensitive, Critical-Sensitive, or Non-Critical-Sensitive ... ;
(2) An employee who has been granted access to classified information
or may be granted access to classified information pursuant to a
determination of trustworthiness by an agency head . . . ;
(3) Individuals serving under Presidential appointments;
(4) Law enforcement officers ... ; and
(5) Other positions that the agency head determines involve law enforcement, national security, the protection of life and property, public
health or safety, or other functions requiring a high degree of trust
and confidence.
[d. § 7(d)(1)-(5) (emphasis added).
14. Martha I. Finney, The Right To Be Tested, 33 PERSONNEL ADM. 74, 74 (1988)
(" About a third of U.S. businesses and government agencies have implemented
drug testing in the workplace, including nine out of 10 utilities, eight out of
10 transportation operations and half of sports associations and government
agencies. ").
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officers,15 correction officers,16 probationary school teachers,17 nuclear
power plant employees,18 racing commission licensees,19 and city
transit authority conductors20 have been subjected to drug testing. 21
As a result of these testing programs, many government employees are questioning the constitutionality of drug testing. Unlike
private sector programs,22 government drug testing programs constitute state action, enabling opponents to invoke the protection of the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 23 The Fourth
15. See McCloskey v. Honolulu Police Dep't, 799 P.2d 953 (Haw. 1990) (upholding

16.
17.

18.

19.
20.
21.

22.

23.

drug testing of a police officer); Doe v. City of Honolulu, 816 P.2d 306 (Haw.
Ct. App. 1991) (upholding the fire department's suspicion less drug testing of
urine specimens collected at the time of the fire fighters' annual physical
examination); O'Connor v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 557 N.E.2d 1146 (Mass.
1990) (holding that unannounced, warrantless, suspicionless urinalysis testing
of profiled police cadets was constitutional).
See Seelig v. Koehler, 556 N.E.2d 125 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 134
(1990) (upholding mandatory, random drug testing of all correction officers).
See Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 505 N.Y.S.2d
888 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (testing probationary teachers without individualized
suspicion held unconstitutional), a/I'd, 510 N.E.2d 325 (N.Y. 1987).
See Alverado v. Washington Public Power Supply Sys., 759 P.2d 427 (Wash.
1988) (upholding mandatory urinalysis drug testing for all prospective employees
at a municipally-owned nuclear power plant), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004
(1989).
Holthus v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 580 So. 2d 469 (La. Ct. App.)
(upholding drug testing of all licensees of commission, except owners who are
not trainers), cert. denied, 584 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1991).
Dozier v. New York City, 519 N.Y.S.2d 135 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (upholding
New York City Transit Authority drug testing of three applicants for the
position of conductor).
Urinalysis is the most popular method of drug testing for several reasons:
(I) The collection of urine is noninvasive; (2) large volumes can be
collected easily; (3) drugs and metabolites are generally present in
higher concentrations in urine than in other tissues or fluids ... ; (4)
urine is easier to analyze than blood and other tissues ... ; and (5)
drugs and their metabolites are usually very stable in frozen urine,
allowing long-term storage of positive samples.
Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association, Scientific Issues
in Drug Testing, 257 JAMA 3110, 3111 (1987). Although blood tests are more
invasive than urinalysis tests, they can be tailored to detect recent drug use.
Tia S. Denenberg & Richard V. Denenberg, Employee Drug Testing and the
Arbitrator: What Are the Issues? 42 ARB. J. 19,27 (1987); Kurt M. Dubowski,
Drug-Use Testing: Scientific Perspectives, II NOVA L. REv. 415, 427-28, 432·
35 (1987).
The Fourth Amendment does not apply to private employers in the absence
of "state action." See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). The
Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
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Amendment prohibits the federal government and its agents from
engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures. 24 State constitutional
provisions, such as Maryland's Declaration of Rights, also forbid
unreasonable government searches and seizures. 2s The ultimate determination of a search's "reasonableness," however, requires the balancing of the intrusiveness of the search against its promotion of a
legitimate government interest. 26
In the past, federal and state courts have consistently struck
down government drug testing programs as unreasonable searches
and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 27 In Capua v.

24.
25.

26.

27.

violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV ..
See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,335 (1985). A search conducted
by governmental actors assumes constitutional significance, however, only when
it is also unreasonable. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985).
The Maryland Declaration of Rights provides:
That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected
places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous [sic] and
oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to
apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing the place,
or the person in special, are illegal, and ought not to be granted.
MD. CONST. CODE ANN. art. 26 (1981).
Although this Article focuses on public-sector employees, seven state
constitutions contain a protection for the right of privacy which may presumably
be violated by the mandatory drug testing of private-sector employees. See
ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § I; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5;
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10;
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); see United States v. Montoya
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (stating that reasonableness is determined in light of "all of the circumstances surrounding the search . . . and
the nature of the search ... itself"); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765
(1969) (stating that reasonableness is determined by the facts and circumstances
of each case "in the light of established Fourth Amendment principles");
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967) (stating that reasonableness of a
search and seizure is determined by the facts and circumstances of each case).
See Georgia Ass'n of Educators v. Harris, 749 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Ga. 1990)
(holding drug testing of all job applicants unconstitutional); Beattie v. City of
St. Petersburg Beach, 733 F. Supp. 1455, 1458 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (holding
suspicionless drug testing of firefighters unconstitutional since the city could
not demonstrate any evidence of drug use, on- or off-duty, or a history of
accidents attributable to drug use); American Postal Workers Union v. Frank,
725 F. Supp. 87 (D. Mass. 1989) (ruling drug testing of job applicants without
individualized suspicion unconstitutional); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees
v. Thornburgh, 720 F. Supp. 154 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (holding mandatory, random
urinalysis testing of all Federal Bureau of Prisons employees unconstitutional).
See generally Phyllis T. Bookspan, Behind Open Doors: Constitutional Implications of Government Employee Drug Testing, 11 NOVA L. REV. 307, 337
(1987) (stating that a majority of lower courts have held drug testing procedures
unconstitutional).
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City of Plainfield,28 a federal district court was confronted with the
issue of whether a substance abuse testing program implemented by
a New Jersey city's police and fire departments was constitutional.
Under the program, all members of the police and fire departments
were subject to surprise urinalysis testing. 29 The city based implementation of the program upon the belief that its duty to protect
the public welfare mandated the employment of drug-free police
officers and fire fighters. 3o The Capua court, however, held that the
program constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. 31 The court reasoned that the program
not only "[swept] up the innocent with the guilty" employees but
also "sacrifice[d] each [employee's] Fourth Amendment rights in the
name of some larger public interest. "32
In Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga,33 municipal fire fighters
were required to submit to blood and urinalysis tests and "pat
downs" at the discretion of the city fire and police commissioners.
The Sixth Circuit held that the regulation authorizing a departmentwide drug test violated the Fourth Amendment as an unreasonable
search and seizure. 34 The Lovvorn court found no evidence of a
widespread drug problem or an individualized suspicion which would
have justified the program. 3S
More recently, however, federal courts have upheld certain drug
testing procedures by finding exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
warrant and probable cause requirements. 36 In Amalgamated Transit

28. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
29. [d. at 1511-12. The program implemented called for testing en masse, rather
than individual testing. See id.
30. [d. at 1515.
31. [d. at 1517.
32. [d.
33. 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988).
34. [d. at 1547.
35. [d.
36. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1533 v. Cheney, 944 F.2d 503,
509 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the Navy's
random drug testing of civilian employees holding security clearances with
access to classified information); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Department
of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292, 1309 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding constitutionality
of drug testing of commercial drivers subject to Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) regulations); Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1194 (D.C.
Cir.) (holding urine tests of applicants for positions as attorneys at the
Department of Justice did not constitute "unreasonable searches" under the
Fourth Amendment), cert. denied sub nom., Willner v. Barr, 112 S. Ct. 669
(1991); Hartness v. Bush, 919 F.2d 170, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding random
urinalysis testing of employees with "secret" security clearances was constitutional), cerl. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2890 (1991); Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d
484, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (allowing random drug testing of Justice Department
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Union v. Cambria County Transit Authority,37 the court permitted
drug testing as part of the employee's regularly scheduled physical
examination, even absent evidence of drug abuse among transit
emplo'yees. 38 The Amalgamated Transit Union court reasoned that
"the Authority need not await the development of a problem[;] it
may take preventative measures."39 Similarly, in Wrightsell v. City
of Chicago,40 the court held that mandatory drug testing of police
officers returning from leave of thirty days or more, conducted
during a routine medical examination, was not an unreasonable search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 41 In Wrightsell, the
court reasoned that requiring a urine sample as part of a physical
examination is a minimal intrusion. 42 The diversity of opinion in the
federal courts drew the attention of the Supreme Court. .
On March 21, 1989, the Supreme Court handed down two
decisions upholding the constitutionality of certain government-ordered drug testing programs.43 In Skinner v. Railway Labor Execu-

37.
38.
39.

40.
41.

42.
43.

personnel holding top secret national security clearances), cert. denied sub
nom., Bell v. Thornburgh, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990); Holloman v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Auth., 741 F. Supp. 677, 686 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (upholding constitionality of drug testing of transit bus drivers), a/i'd, 930 F.2d
918 (6th Cir. 1991). But see American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Sullivan,
787 F. Supp. 255 (D. D.C. 1992) (granting "permanent injunction against the
testing of motor vehicle operators whose duties do not include the transportation
of passengers" or highly classified materials).
The Supreme Court has recognized that requiring the government to
procure a warrant for every work-related intrusion "would conflict with 'the
common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every
employment decision became a constitutional matter." , O'Connor v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709, 722 (1987) (plurality opinion) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 143 (1983». A search ordinarily must be based upon probable cause,
even where it is reasonable to dispense with the warrant requirement in certain
circumstances. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
691 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
[d. at 907-08.
[d. at 905.
678 F. Supp. 727 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
[d. at 733-34; see also Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(stating that mandatory drug testing of bus drivers, mechanics and attendants
conducted "during routine, reasonably required annual medical examinations"
minimized intrusion on privacy), vacated sub nom., Jenkins v. Jones, 490 U.S.
1001, modified on remand, 878 F.2d 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Amalgamated
Transit Union, Local 993 v. City of Oklahoma City, 710 F. Supp. 1321, 133132 (W.D. Okla. 1988) (conducting mandatory drug testing of municipal transit
employees operationally' involved in the transportation service during the course
of regularly conducted medical examinations minimized intrusiveness).
Wrightsell, 678 F. Supp. at 733.
See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
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tives' Ass'n,44 the Court, by a 7-2 vote, upheld Federal Railroad
Administration regulations that mandated testing of blood and urine
samples for drug use by employees following major train accidents
or the violation of safety standards. 45 The Skinner Court held that,
because the compelling government interest served by the regulations
outweighed employees' privacy interests, the drug and alcohol testing
mandated by Federal Railroad Administration regulations was reasonable despite the lack of a warrant or reasonable suspicion that a
particular employee might be impaired. 46 The Court reasoned that
the governmental interests in preventing railroad accidents "justifie[d]
prohibiting covered employees from using alcohol or drugs on duty. "47
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,48 the Court
upheld mandatory urinalysis testing of Custom Service employees
who sought promotion into jobs that involved either the interdiction
of illegal drugs or the carrying of firearms.49 The Von Raab Court
held that, although the Custom Service's drug testing program was
subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
a warrant was not necessary because testing employees applying for
promotions to positions involving interdiction of illegal drugs or
requiring them to carry firearms was reasonable under the Fourth

44. 489 U.S. 602 (1989). Although Justice Stevens concurred with the opinion, he
disagreed with the Court's conclusion that the drug testing program served to
deter drug and alcohol abuse. [d. at 634-35 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented:
The majority's concern with the railroad safety problems caused by
drug and alcohol abuse is laudable; its cavalier disregard for the text
of the Constitution is not. There is no drug exception to the Constitution, any more than there is a communism exception or an exception
for other real or imagined sources of domestic unrest.
[d. at 641 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 455 (1971).
45. [d. at 632-33. "These accidents involved a fatality, release of hazardous
material, or damage to railroad property above a specified amount." Michael
A. Mass, Public Sector Drug Testing: A Balancing Approach and the Search
For a New Equilibrium, 42 BAYLOR L. REv. 231, 238 n.45 (1990) (citing
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 608 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.20(a)(l)-(3) (1987»).
"Government officials said that from 1972 through 1983, railroad accidents
linked to drug or alcohol abuse killed 42 persons, injured 61 and caused $19
million in property damage." Stephen Kurkjian, Justices OK Drug Tests in
Some Jobs, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 22, 1989, at 1.
In January 1987 a Conrail freight train collided with an Amtrak train near
Baltimore, killing 16 persons and injuring 158 persons. [d. According to tests
conducted, the Conrail engineer and brakeman had smoked marijuana just
prior to the accident. [d.
46. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634.
47. [d. at 621.
48. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
49. [d. at 677.
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Amendment. so

The Court reasoned that safeguarding the borders of
the United States as well as the safety of the public outweighed the
Custom Service employees' privacy expectations with respect to the
urine testing program. SI
In Von Raab, the Court stated that "requiring employees ...
to produce urine samples for chemical testing implicate[s] the Fourth
Amendment, as those tests invade reasonable expectations of privacy!'S2 In Skinner, however, the Court stated that "where the
privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal and where an
important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be
placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a
search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion. "S3
Thus, as a result of these two Supreme Court cases, the following
standard has emerged: A government employee may be tested when
there is a reasonable suspicion that the employee is impaired by, or
under the influence of, drugs while at work or when a compelling
government interest served by the regulations outweighs the employee's privacy concerns.
II. CITY OF ANNAPOLIS v. UNITED FOOD &
COMMERCIAL WORKERS, LOCAL 400
In 1986, the City of Annapolis proposed a drug testing plan as
part of the regularly scheduled physical examinations required for
50. rd.
51. [d. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented: "I think it obvious that

this justification is unacceptable; that the impairment of individual liberties
cannot be the means of making a point; that symbolism, even symbolism for
so worthy a cause as the abolition of unlawful drugs, cannot validate an
otherwise unreasonable search." [d. at 687 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall, again joined by Justice Brennan, dissented for the same reasons as
in Skinner. [d. at 679 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-18). In Skinner,
the Supreme Court stated:
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than
the passing of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they
talk about it at all. It is a function traditionally performed without
public observation; indeed, its performance in public is generally
prohibited by law as well as social custom. . . . [T]he Federal Courts
of Appeals have concluded unanimously, and we agree, that these
intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (citation omitted).
In City of Annapolis v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 400,
317 Md. 544, 551,565 A.2d 672, 675 (1989), the Court of Appeals of Maryland
noted that "[a] 'search' occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to consider reasonable is infringed." [d. at 551 n.2, 565 A.2d at 675
n.2 (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984».
53. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
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city uniformed police and fire fightersY The unions objected to parts
of the plan, and when the parties could not reach an agreement, the
City filed an unfair labor practices complaint with the State Mediation
and Conciliation Service (hereinafter "Service").55 The Service found
that the City's drug testing program was constitutional and permitted
it to be imposed. 56 The unions appealed to the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County, which held that the plan was unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment because it was not based on individualized suspicion of drug use among the employeesY The City
appealed, and the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari
prior to consideration by the court of special appeals. 58 On certiorari,
the court of appeals reversed the trial court. 59
In United Food, the court of appeals held that a program of
mandatory suspicionless drug testing of uniformed police and fire
fighters did not violate the Fourth Amendment when conducted
during an employee's regularly scheduled physical examination. 60 The
court noted that employees had a diminished expectation of privacy
because they had previously consented to urinalyses during routine
physical examinations. 61 With the Skinner and Von Raab cases as
their guide, the court of appeals reasoned that the City's interest in
the safety of police and fire fighters, co-workers, and the public was
sufficiently compelling to outweigh the privacy interests of police
and fire personnel. 62
The Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the constitutionality
of the City of Annapolis' drug testing program. Although some
degree of individualized suspicion is normally required for searches
in the absence of the warrant and probable cause requirements of
the Fourth Amendment, there are exceptions, as illustrated in the

54. United Food, 317 Md. at 546, 565 A.2d at 672-73.
55. [d. at 546, 565 A.2d at 673. See generally MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMF. §

56.
57.

58.
59.
60.

61.
62.

4-103 (1991) (The Mediation Service is a unit functioning within the State
Division of Labor and Industry.).
United Food, 317 Md. at 547-48, 565 A.2d at 673-74.
[d. at 548-49, 565 A.2d at 674.
[d. at 550, 565 A.2d at 675.
[d. at 566-67, 565 A.2d at 683.
[d. at 566, 565 A.2d at 683. The court of appeals held that the City's drug
testing program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Further, the court
reasoned that while the Fourth Amendment and the Maryland Declaration of
Rights are independent of each other, the two constitutional provisions should
be read in pari materia. [d. at 566 n.4, 565 A.2d at 683 n.4 (citing Widgeon
v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 300 Md. 520, 532, 479 92A.2d 921, 927 (1984);
Gahan v. State, 290 Md. 310, 319-20,430 A.2d 49, 54 (1981); Attorney Gen.
v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 714, 426 A.2d 929, 946 (1981».
United Food, 317 Md. at 553, 565 A.2d at 676.
[d. at 561-63, 565 A.2d at 680-81.
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Supreme Court cases of Von Raab and Skinner. 63 The court of
appeals balanced the governmental interests in conducting the search
against the employee's expectation of privacy in deciding whether
the search was reasonable. 64

A.

Privacy Interests
In evaluating the privacy interests of the employees, the court
of appeals focused· on the actual drug analysis of the uriQe sample,
not on the mandatory taking of the sample. 6s The reason for this
focus was that the employees "had participated for several years,
without objection, in providing urine specimens for analysis as part
of their required periodic physical examinations."66 Although the
court acknowledged that the actual assaying of samples for drug use
constituted a search, the court found that "the intrusion on [the
employee's] reasonable expectations of privacy was not only 'minimal' under Skinner and Von Raab, but negligible for several reasons."67
First, the court of appeals observed that the employees received
three distinct notices of testing: (1) the physical would be during
their "birthday" month; (2) within thirty days, they knew the week
of the examination; and (3) within forty-eight hours, they knew the
63. [d. at 552, 565 A.2d at 676 (citations omitted). Compare National Treasury
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding suspicionless drug testing
for Custom Service employees applying for promotion to positions involving
interdiction of illegal drugs or requiring them to carry firearms) and Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding suspicionless drug testing for railroad employees involved in certain train accidents
or violations of safety standards) with City of Annapolis v. United Food &
Commercial Workers, Local 400, 317 Md. 544, 565 A.2d 672 (1989) (upholding
suspicionless drug testing for police and fire fighter personnel when conducted
during the employee's annual physical examination).
64. United Food, 317 Md. at 553-63, 565 A.2d at 676-81. Whether a search is
reasonable depends upon a balancing test set forth by Justice O'Connor in
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), as follows:
A determination of the standard of reasonableness applicable to a
particular class of searches requires "[balancing) the nature and quality
of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify
the intrusion." In the case of searches conducted by a public employer,
we must balance the invasion of the employees' legitimate expectations
of privacy against the government's need for supervision, control, and
the efficient operation of the workplace.
[d. at 719-20 (quoting United States v.Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983»
(citations omitted).
65. See United Food, 317 Md. at 553, 565 A.2d at 676.
66. [d. For several years, police and fire fighters participated in periodic physical
examinations where a urine specimen was used to analyze for physiological
explications other than drug use. [d.
67. [d.
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time of the examination.68 The court compared the case before it
with Von Raab and found that, in the latter case, the employees
also received advance notice of the test date. 69 The court explained
that receiving three notices prior t~ testing helped minimize the
intrusion on the employees' privacy interests and allayed any anxieties
about drug testing. 70
Second, the court found that disclosure of "private facts,"
including signs of physical infirmities or latent diseases, was already
part of the employees' periodic physical examination.71 The court
stated that physicians skilled in urinalysis would examine the urine
sample for such latent diseases or infirmities.72 The court emphasized
that the United Food case involved a lesser degree of intrusion than
Skinner, because the tests in Skinner were not part of a regularly
scheduled physical examination. Furthermore, Skinner required only
"that the urine tests . . . not be used to inquire into private facts
unrelated to alcohol or drug use. "73 Therefore, the possible disclosure
of private facts in United Food was deemed not to be a significant
invasion of privacy.
Third, the court of appeals noted that the employees were
required to complete a medication form to insure that the test results
were accurate. 74 Similarly, in Skinner, railroad employees were required to fill out a form listing any medication taken within thirty
days before the test. 7S The court in United Food explained that, like
Skinner, the purpose of the medication form was "to discover
whether a positive test result may be explained by the employee's
lawful use of drugs. "76 The court of appeals addressed the concern
that the completion of a medication form by the employee permitted
the government to learn private facts about an individual that the
individual did not want disclosed, such as epilepsy, pregnancy or
diabetes." The court, however, found that there was no indication
that the government would disclose such information or use it for
other purposes. 78 In addition, the court was confident that, even
68. Id. at 554, 565 A.2d at 676-77.
69. Id. at 553-54, 565 A.2d at 676-77.

70.Id.
71. Id. at 554, 565 A.2d at 677.
72.Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 555, 565 A.2d at 677.
75. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 n.7 (1989).
The Court did not find it a significant invasion of privacy that employees
giving blood or urine samples must disclose all medications taken within 30
days. Id.
76. United Food, 317 Md. at 555, 565 A.2d at 677; see Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626
n.7.
77. United Food, 317 Md. at 555, 565 A.2d at 677 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at
626 n.7).
78.Id.
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without drug testing, such disclosure of facts would be the subject
of an inquiry during the course of the employee's regularly scheduled
physical examination. 79 The purpose of the annual physical examination was to uncover all medical facts having a bearing on the
employee's health and fitness in performing his duties. Con.sequently,
urinalysis was not likely to reveal any personal information, other
than the use of drugs, that had not already been uncovered in the
annual physical examination.
Finally, the regular physical examinations were used to inquire
into the employees' fitness and probity.so The court observed that
the program's objective was to provide secure and proficient working
conditions for its employees and to protect the public by regulating
and treating the illegal use of drugs. 81 In Von Raab, the Supreme
Court held that employees involved in drug interdiction, or those
who carry a firearm, should expect their employer to inquire into
their physical fitness and integrity: "Because successful performance
of their duties depends uniquely on their judgment and dexterity.
these employees cannot reasonably expect to keep from the [Custom]
Service personal information that bears directly on their fitness. "82
Similarly, the United Food court recognized the City of Annapolis' police and fire personnel were also "required to meet a
minimum level of fitness to sustain the demands of physical and
mental stress that may arise spontaneously and in a manner not
experienced by other public employees."83 The court, however, failed
to recognize that the City's program goes beyond the guidelines of
Skinner. In Skinner, suspicionless drug testing was allowed because
the railroad industry is a highly regulated industry notorious for its
alcohol and drug abuse problem. 84 Based upon such clear evidence
of a serious crisis in public safety, the Supreme Court upheld
suspicionless testing, but only after a serious train accident occurred.
Although there was no evidence of a significant drug or alcohol
1992]

79. [d.
80. [d. at 555-56, 565 A.2d at 677-78.
81. [d. at 556, 565 A.2d at 677.

82. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672 (1989).
83. United Food, 317 Md. at 556, 565 A.2d at 677-78; see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN.,
LAB. & EMP. § 9-503 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
84. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 607 (1989). In
Skinner, the FRA testing regulations resulted from a study which determined
that "an estimated one out of every eight railroad workers drank at least once
while on duty during the study year." [d. at 607 n.1 (citations omitted). In
addition, "5070 of workers reported to work 'very drunk' or 'got very drunk'
on duty at least once in the study year," and "13% of workers reported to
work at least 'a little drunk' one or more times during that period." [d. The
study also found that 23070 of the operating personnel were "problem drinkers,"
but that only 4% of these employees "were receiving help through an employee
assistance program .... " [d.
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abuse problem in the City's police and fire departments, the United
Food court concluded that the purpose for the City's drug testing
was "reasonably and objectively related to the accepted purpose of
medically investigating the employee's fitness for duty. "85
To strengthen their decision, the United Food court equated the
case before it with Amalgamated Transit Union v. Cambria County
Transit Authority,86 and distinguished Lovvorn v. City oj ChattanoogaY Amalgamated Transit Union involved a requested preliminary
injunction against mandatory drug and alcohol testing of municipal
bus drivers and mechanics during regularly scheduled physical examinations. 88 The court in Amalgamated Transit Union held that the
intrusion on the employees' privacy rights was minimal because the
drug testing of employees had been a routine part of their annual
physical examination. 89 Moreover, the Amalgamated Transit Union
court believed it was important for the transit authority to take
preventive measures to insure the safety of its employees and the
general public. 90
In both Amalgamated Transit Union and United Food, there
was little or no evidence that a drug or alcohol problem existed in
the work force. 91 Moreover, both cases involved tests performed only
during regularly scheduled physical examinations that already included the taking of urine or blood samples. 92 Finally, Amalgamated
Transit Union and United Food involved unobserved specimen taking,
a confirmatory test in the event that the initial test results were
positive, and procedures that protected the confidentiality of the
employees. 93
Conversely, in Lovvorn, employees were not only subjected to
a drug test, but also "pat downs" at the discretion of the city fire
and police commissioners.94 Unlike the program at issue in United
Food, some fire fighters were even required to provide urine samples
under the "direct observation" of their superiors. 9s In Lovvorn, there

85. United Food, 317 Md. at 556, 565 A.2d at 678.
86. 691 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
87. 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), a/I'd. 846 "F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988).
vacated en banc sub nom., Penny v. Kennedy. 915 F.2d 1065 (6th Cir. 1990).
88. 691 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
89. [d. at 904.
90. See id. at 908.
91. See id. at 904-05; United Food. 317 Md. at 564-65. 565 A.2d at 682.
92. See Amalgamated Transit Union. 691 F. Supp. at 904; United Food. 317 Md.
at 553, 565 A.2d at 676.
93. Amalgamated Transit Union. 691 F. Supp. at 900-01; United Food, 317 Md.
at 554, 565 A.2d at 677.
94. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539. 1540 (6th Cir. 1988).
95. [d.
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was no written directive or policy statement delineating the methods
for testing, managing, or analyzing the urine samples. 96 Therefore,
the court of appeals recognized that the "unstructured and discretionary" nature of the drug testing program in Lovvorn was significantly more intrusive than the drug screening program in United

Food. 97
B.

Governmental Interests

The United Food court identified two compelling governmental
interests advanced by the drug tests: (1) ensuring that front-line
interdiction employees are physically competent, and (2) ensuring
that they have impeccable character and judgment. 98 To justify its
reasoning, the court noted with approval the statement in Von Raab
that "'the public should not bear the risk that employees who may
suffer from impaired perception and judgment will be promoted to
positions where they may need. to employ deadly force." '99 The
United Food court concluded that police officers encounter similar
risks, in that they also are involved in front-line drug interdiction
and are permitted to carry firearms whether on-duty or off-duty.100
Furthermore, police may be placed in a life threatening situation in
which they must exercise split second judgment in the use of their
firearms. 101
With respect to the City's fire fighters, the court observed that
although fire fighters do not interdict drugs, carry firearms, or handle
state secrets, fire fighters are "charged with duties to respond quickly
and effectively at a moment's notice," and their actions have serious
implications with regard to the life and property of others. 102 Thus,
the court of appeals in United Food held that the City's interest in
the safety of personnel, co-workers, and the public outweighed the
privacy interests of the police and fire fighters. 103
C.

Suspicion less Drug Testing

The Union's argument that a search warrant is required before
drug testing is permitted also did not sway the court. Noting that
96. [d. at 1541.
97. United Food, 317 Md. at 558-59, 565 A.2d at 679.
98. [d. at 561-62, 565 A.2d at 680 (citing National Treasury Employees Union v.

Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670 (1988».
99. [d. at 562, 565 A.2d at 680-81 (quoting Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671). The Von
Raab Court likened such risks to those identified in Skinner, where a brief
lapse of concentration by employees of the railroad "can have disastrous
consequences." Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989».
100. United Food, 317 Md. at 562, 565 A.2d at 681.
101. [d.
102. See id. at 562, 565 A.2d at 680.
103. [d. at 562, 565 A.2d at 681.
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"there is not a great privacy expectation in the drug analysis of an
employee's urine produced in this regular examination procedure,"
the court concluded that "[a] warrant requirement would add little
protection to that privacy." 104 While acknowledging that the primary
purpose of a warrant is to protect privacy interests by assuring
citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are neither
random nor arbitrary, the court further stated that the City's program
was structured to deter illegal drug use, which would be hampered
by a warrant requirement. lOS Quoting from Von Raab, the court
asserted that where drug testing is not premised on "a discretionary
determination to search based on a judgment that certain conditions
are present, there are simply 'no special facts for a neutral magistrate
to evaluate."'I06 Therefore, the court was logically correct in concluding that (1) a reasonable suspicion requirement was unwarranted,
given the government's superior interest in detecting illegal drug use;
and (2) the warrant justifications were not jeopardized because the
City's program required suspicionless drug testing in the context of
an employee's nondiscretionary physical examination.107

D.

Random Drug Testing

Although random drug testing was not an issue in United Food,
the court indicated in dictum that a random physical examination
would require the court to apply a more rigid review.108 Moreover,
the court of appeals noted that jurisdictions are split as to the
constitutionality of suspicion less random drug testing in the public
sector .109 For example, some jurisdictions have upheld random drug
testing,IIO while others have required some degree of suspicion. III The
104. [d. at 563-64, 565 A.2d at 681.

105. [d. at 563-64, 565 A.2d at 681-82.
[d. at 564, 565 A.2d 681-82.
[d.
[d. at 561, 565 A.2d at 680.
[d. at 559-61, 565 A.2d at 679-80.
See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1533 v. Cheney, 944 F.2d 503
(9th Cir. 1991) (upholding random drug testing by the Navy of civilian
employees having security clearances and access to classified information);
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Department of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292 (9th
Cir. 1991) (upholding "random, biennial, preemployment and post accident
testing of urine samples of truck drivers without [a] warrant or without
individualized suspicion"); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Skinner,
885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding suspicionless random drug testing of
federal transportation workers constitutional), cerl. denied, 495 U.S. 923 (1990);
Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1989) (upholding random drug
testing for civilian employees at a chemical weapons plant); Guiney v. Roache,
873 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir.) (holding suspicionless random drug testing of city
police constitutional), cerl. denied, 493 U.S. 963 (1989); Policemen's Benevolent

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
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legality of purely random drug testing of government workers has
not yet been decided by the United States Supreme Court. To date,
the Court has consistently declined to review cases such as Harmon
v. Thornhurghl12 and Hartness v. Bush,1I3 both of which address this
issue.
III.

DRUG TESTING OF MARYLAND STATE EMPLOYEES

On April 7, 1989, Governor William Donald Schaefer outlined
the State's commitment to a drug-free workplace in an executive
order entitled "State of Maryland Substance Abuse Policy," 114 which
made it a condition of employment that all state employees refrain
from using illegal drugs. liS Although subsequently rescinded by a

Ill.

112.
113.
114.

115.

Ass'n v. Township of Washington, 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding
suspicion less random urinalysis of police officers constitutional), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1004 (1989).
See National Treasury Employees Union v. Yeutter, 918 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (department of agriculture employees who do not hold safety or securitysensitive jobs); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987) (prison
employees having daily contact with prisoners); Beattie v. City of St. Petersburg
Beach, 733 F. Supp. 1455 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (fire fighters); Wrightsell v. City
of Chicago, 678 F. Supp. 727 (N.D. 1II. 1988) (police officers not tested as
part of routine, reasonably-required medical examination); Smith v. White, 666
F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Tenn. 1987) (nuclear plant employees), a/I'd, 857 F.2d
1475 (6th Cir. 1988); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651
F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (department of defense civilian police officers
holding "critical" jobs); McKenzie v. Jackson, 556 N.E.2d 1072 (N.Y. 1990)
(probationary correction officers).
878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom., Bell v. Thornburgh,
493 U.S. 1056 (1990) (holding random drug testing by urinalysis of personnel
holding "top secret" security clearances was permissible).
919 F.2d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 2890 (1991) (holding
random drug testing by urinalysis of employees who held "secret" security
clearances was permissible).
16:8 Md. Reg. 900 (1989) (codified at Exec. Order (COMAR) 01.01.1989.05
(rescinded by Exec. Order (COMAR) 01.01.1991.16»; see COMAR 06.01.09
(delineating current drug testing regulations). The 1989 Executive Order amended
the January 9, 1989 drug testing regulations under COMAR 06.01.01 which
previously allowed the Secretary of Personnel to test employees for drug abuse
only upon "reasonable suspicion." See COMAR 06.01.09.04(A) (Supp. 10,
1988). As of November 20, 1990, the Secretary of Personnel is authorized to
test state employees in "sensitive positions" or in "sensitive classifications"
on a random basis. See COMAR 06.01.09.04(B). As indicated, the Governor's
original order, Exec. Order (COMAR) 01.01.1989.05, was rescinded by a
subsequent order in 1991, Exec. Order (COMAR) 01.01.1991.16.
At the time of its implementation, the Substance Abuse Policy was expected
to affect approximately 13,000 state workers. Maryland: Drug Testing, Individual Emp. Rights Newsletter (BNA) (Nov. 20, 1990) in WL 5 IER 21d 4, at
*1.
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more comprehensive order, 116 both the original order and its successor
emphasize the commitment "to making good faith efforts to insure
a safe, secure, and drug-free workplace for its employees consistent
with the Drug-Free Workplace Act as enacted by Congress."117 Thus,
the Governor's orders focus not upon the use of drug testing or
screening as a specific means of identifying drug users, but upon the
broader goal of removing from the workplace those employees whose
drug or alcohol use jeopardizes the safety or security of themselves
or others. In this regard, both the original order and its successor
explicitly recognize the distinct status of employees in "sensitive"
classifications,1I8 a theme also echoed by the COMAR regulations
that implement the testing of state employees for illegal drug use. 1I9
Maryland's drug testing statute, section 17-214.1 of the HealthGeneral Code, specifically grants private employers the right to test
for drug or alcohol use by employees or applicants. 12o Currently,
there is no Maryland statute directly requiring state agencies to
implement drug testing programs for their employees. 121 Pursuant to
Article 64A of the Annotated Code of Maryland, however, the
. Secretary of Personnel for the State of Maryland has the authority
to adopt by regulation a drug testing program. 122 After consulting
with the Attorney General of Maryland,123 regulations establishing a
procedure for testing for illegal drug use by state employees and
applicants for state employment were proposed by the Secretary in
June 1988 124 and adopted in December of that year.12S As originally
adopted, the regulations required the testing of all applicants l26 and
116.

See Exec. Order (COMAR) 01.01.1991.06 (codifying 18:8 Md. Reg. 848 (1991».

117. [d. 01.01.1991.06(B)(I); accord Exec. Order (COMAR) 01.01.l989.05(C).

118. Exec. Order (COMAR) 01.01.1991.16(A)(7); Exec. Order (CO MAR)
01.01.1989.05(A)(6).
119. See COMAR 06.01.09.01(B)(8).
120. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 17-214.1 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
121. See 75 Op. Au'y Gen. Md. 91 (1990). On January 17, 1990 Delegate Ryan
introduced H.D. 370, which would have authorized the Secretary of Personnel
to establish and implement a drug testing program for all State applicants and
employees in "sensitive positions" or upon individualized suspicion. H.D.
370, Reg. Sess. (1990). However, on April 9, 1990 the bill was withdrawn
from the House Appropriations Committee. Telephone Interview with Esther
Bishop, Department of Legislative Reference, General Assembly of Maryland,
Library and Information Services Division (Dec. 28, 1990).
122. 75 Op. Au'y Gen. Md. 91, 98 (1990); see COMAR 06.01.09 (delineating
current drug testing regulations).
123. See 71 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 58 (1986).
124. See 15:13 Md. Reg. 1559 (1988) (codified as adopted and amended at COMAR
06.01.09).
125. See 15:27 Md. Reg. 3126 (1988) (codified as amended at COMAR 06.01.09).
126. As defined in COMAR, "applicant" "means a person who is seeking an
employer-employee relationship in a position in a sensitive classification or in
a sensitive position." COMAR 06.01.09.01(B)(2).

Government Drug Testing in Maryland
19
I27
applicant-employee-s for positions in "sensitive classifications"128
who had "not been eliminated from consideration at an earlier stage
of the recruitment process." 129 Incumbent employees performing in
sensitive classifications, however, were subject to drug testing only
"if the condition of reasonable suspicion exist[ed]." 130
In March 1990, following the issuance of the Skinner and Von
Raab opinions by the Supreme Court, the Secretary of Personnel·
proposed that the scope of the State's employee drug testing program
be expanded. 13I The most significant changes were (1) the broadening
of circumstances under which incumbent "sensitive" employees could
be required to submit to drug testing; and (2) the implementation of
random testing of employees. The new regulations, adopted in August
1990,132 permitted an "appointing authority" 133 to require that an
employee be tested if the following conditions were present:
(1) The appointing authority had reasonable suspicion that
a test would produce evidence of illegal drug use; or
1992]

127. As defined in COMAR, "applicant-employee" "means an employee of the
State who is an applicant for a position that is: (a) In a sensitive classification
or is a sensitive position; and (b) Different from or in addition to the position
currently held by the applicant-employee." COMAR 06.01.09.01(8)(3).
128. Under the regulations, a "sensitive classification" means
a classification in the classified service in which the Secretary [of
Personnel] has determined that all of the following conditions exist:
(a) A substantially significant degree of responsibility for the
safety of others;
(b) A potential that impaired performance of the employee could
result in death of or injury to the employee or others; and
(c) Lack of close monitoring of the employee's behavior, which
reduces the possibility of intervention or assistance by another when
necessary.
15:13 Md. Reg. 1559, 1560 (1988) (codified as amended at COMAR
06.01.09.01 (8)(8».
129. Id. (codified as amended at COMAR 06.01.09.03(8».
130. Id. at 1561 (codified as amended at COMAR 06.01.09.04(A»; 15:27 Md. Reg.
3126, 3127 (1988) (codified as amended at COMAR 06.01.09.04(A». At the
time the regulations were originally adopted, the Attorney General believed
that "[m]andatory testing of most categories of State employees would violate
the Fourth Amendment prohibition against 'unreasonable searches and seizures.'" 71 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 58, 59 (1986).
131. See 17:5 Md. Reg. 649 (1990) (codified as adopted and amended at COMAR
06.01.09). The COMAR drug testing provisions were again ainended in 1991
in order to offer more protection to employees who tested positive; to require
the use of only those laboratories whose services have been contracted by the
Department of Personnel; and to clarify the confidentiality protections of test
results. 18:9 Md. Reg. 1007 (1991); 18:5 Md. Reg. 598 (1991); see 17:26 Md.
Reg. 2972 (1990).
132. See 17:15 Md. Reg. 1854 (1990).
133. An "appointing authority" is defined as "a person who has the power to
make appointments and to terminate employment." COMAR 06.01.09.01(8)(4).
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(2) The employee was directly involved in an incident that
resulted in injury to person(s) or property; or
(3) The employee notified his or her appointing authority
that the employee was voluntarily participating in a drug
abuse rehabilitation program. 134
In addition, the 1990 regulations require that "[e]ach appointing
authority, with the approval of the Secretary [of Personnel], shall
assure that employees in positions in sensitive classifications or in
sensitive positions within the appointing authority are subject to
random testing for illegal use of drugs."13s
The drug testing program examined by the United Food court
was clearly of more limited scope and applicability than the program
promulgated by the Secretary of Personnel for state employees. In
particular, the regulations require random drug testing of state employees in "sensitive" positions and classifications.t 36 Although United
Food dealt with employees in sensitive positions, the court of appeals
stated in dictum that it had "no occasion to consider whether random
drug testing, not based on reasonable suspicion, unconstitutionally
invades reasonable expectations of privacy." 137 The court did, however, suggest that there might be a constitutionally significant difference between random 138 and mandatory drug testing; 139 "a purely
. random physical examination program for the purpose of drug testing
would likely necessitate more stringent review." 140
The dictum in United Food,' however, has not disabused the
Attorney General of Maryland of the view that random drug testing
of state employees in "sensitive" jobs is constitutional. 141 In an
opinion dated March 2, 1990, Maryland's Attorney General, J.
Joseph Curran, Jr., stated that the principles of Skinner and Von

134. 17:5 Md. Reg. 649, 652 (1990) (codified as adopted and amended at COMAR
06.01.09.04(A».
135. 17:5 Md. Reg. 649, 652 (1990) (codified as adopted and amended at COMAR
06.01.09.04(B)(I». The new § .04(B) also outlined the nature of the random
testing. See id. (codified as adopted and amended at COMAR 06.01.09.04(B)(2)(3».
136. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
137. City of Annapolis v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 400, 317
Md. 544, 561, 565 A.2d 672, 680 (1989).
138. See 17:5 Md. Reg. 649, 652 (1990). "Random testing requires that statistically
significant samples of employees in sensitive classifications or in sensitive
positions be tested on a periodic basis." COMAR 06.01.09.04(B)(2).
139. Mandatory testing requires employees to submit to an urinalysis test for
laboratory study. 71 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 58 (1986).
140. United Food, 317 Md. at 561, 565 A.2d at 680.
141. See 75 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 94 (1990).
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142

Indeed, as pointed out
by the Attorney General, "the only decision of the Fourth Circuit
on this issue stated flatly that 'the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of random drug tests in Skinner ... and .. , Von
Raab .... "'143 The Attorney General's position is also reinforced
by the holding of American Federation of Government Employees
v. Skinner,.44 in which the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia rejected the union's argument that random
testing is more intrusive than the mandatory drug testing condoned
by the Supreme Court:
We find [the] analysis [in Skinner] fully applicable in the
present case. While it is true that the regulations sustained
in Skinner required testing only after a triggering event and
in a medical environment, we do not find that either of
these facts compels a "fundamentally different analysis from
that pursued by the Supreme Court." . ; . While it is true
that random testing may increase employee anxiety and the
invasion of subjective expectations of privacy, it also limits
discretion in the selection process and presumably enhances
drug-use deterrence. 145
Thus, Maryland has determined from the Supreme Court decisions in Skinner and Von Raab that the distinction between random
and mandatory testing is not fundamental, but merely an additional
factor to be evaluated and weighed. Maryland seems to have decided
that a significant intrusion upon privacy is outweighed by a presumed
nexus between drug use and the disclosure of sensitive material.
IV.

TESTING PROCEDURES

Drug testing in Maryland takes the form of analysis of urine
specimens subject to a screening test called an immunoassay.l46 Positive test results from the immunoassay are then confirmed by a Gas
142. [d. at 93. The Attorney General's Office reiterated the position that they
"discern no constitutionally significant difference between categorical testing
and random testing. The determinative point is that testing without individualized suspicion is constitutionally permissible under some circumstances. That
the methodology of a testing program is random rather than categorical makes
no difference, in our view." [d.
143. [d. at 94 (quoting Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113, 114 (4th CiT. 1989».
144. 885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923 (1990).
145. 75 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 95 (1990) (quoting American Fed'n of Gov't Employees
V. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884, 891) (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923
(1990).
146. COMAR 06.01.09.07(A).
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Chromatography - Mass Spectroscopy (GC-MS) test.
Employers
are required to confirm an initial positive result, as well as provide
the employee with a copy of the following:
147

(i) the laboratory test indicating the test results;
(ii) the employer's written policy;
(iii) written notice of the employer's intent to take disciplinary action; and
(iv) the provisions of the law regarding the employee's right
to secure independent verification. l48
Such information must be delivered in person or by certified
mail to the employee within thirty days of the date of the test. 149 In
addition, an employer who requires any person to be tested for illegal
drug use because of job related reasons shall do the following:
(1) Have the specimen tested by a laboratory that

(i) holds a permit under this subtitle; or
(ii) is located outside of the State and is certified or
otherwise approved under [the Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene regulations]; and
(2) At the time of testing, at the person's request, inform
the person of the mime and address of the laboratory that
will test the specimen. ISO
Except for job-related alcohol or controlled dangerous substance
testing, no laboratory, physician, or any other person, may report
positive test results to an employer if the substance detected is a
legal nonprescription drug or a prescription drug that an employee
can show was legitimately prescribed. lSI
These procedures do not apply to:
147. COMAR 06.01.09.07(8). As noted by the Attorney General,
Maryland law does not require that the screening [of positive test
results) be done by a "medical review officer" which is a term in the
guidelines of the federal drug testing program referring to a physician
specially trained in substance abuse disorders who evaluates positive
test results in light of an employee's medical background.
75 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 17 (1990); see MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 17214.1 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
148. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 17-214.1(c)(I)(i)-(iv) (Supp. 1992).
149. [d. § 17-214.1(c)(2)(i)-(ii).
150. [d. § 17-214.1(b)(I)-(2). A laboratory may analyze a specimen only upon order
of a physician except drug tests conducted for job-related reasons may be
ordered directly by an employer with a laboratory. [d. § 17-214.1; see 75 Op.
Att'y Gen. Md. 19, 21 (1990).
151. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 17-214.1(h) (1990 & Supp. 1992). Nondisclosure of information under this section does not apply to a person complying
with the Federal Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 and the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. [d. § 17-214.1(h)(2) (Supp. 1992).
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(1) Alcohol or controlled dangerous substance testing of a

person under arrest or held by a law enforcement or correctional agency;
(2) Alcohol testing procedures conducted by a law enforcement or correctional agency on breath testing equipment
certified by the State Toxicologist; or
(3) Controlled dangerous substance testing by a laboratory
facility of a law enforcement or correctional agency that
maintains laboratory testing standards comparable to the
standards in this section. 152
All of these procedures should be viewed in light of the expressed
poiicy of balancing the employee's right to privacy against the
government's objective of a safe and productive work environment.
V.

IMPACT ON MARYLAND LAW

The initial consequence of the court of appeals decision in United
Food has been the establishment of a prototype for Maryland police
and fire departments that want to implement drug testing. Another
consequence will be the reevaluation of existing government drug
testing programs and the introduction of new programs for other
fields of work affecting the safety of the pUblic.
Also, with the recent implementation of random drug testing by
Maryland's State Department of Personnel for applicants and employees in sensitive and classified positions, the court of appeals will
most likely be asked to rule on random drug testing in the near
future. The full import of the United Food decision will not be
known, however, until there is further litigation in this area. IS3 Of
course, widespread drug testing by itself will not cure the drug
epidemic. Drug testing, combined with strict criminal law enforcement, public relations campaigns, and rehabilitation measures, should
be implemented to reach a large percentage of government employees
in the work force. 154
152. Id. § 17.214.1(f)(1)-(3) (1990 & Supp. 1992).
153. As of the expected publication date of this Article, only one case challenging
the dismissal of a state employee resulting from drug testing had reached the
state's appellate courts. In Singletary v. Maryland State Department of Public
Safety & Correctional Services, 87 Md. App. 405, 589 A.2d 1311 (1991),
however, the dismissed employee did not raise a constitutional challenge.
Instead, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland concluded the employee's
dismissal was invalid because the employee's appointing authority failed to
adequately advise him of the consequences of refusing to be tested. Id. at 418,
589 A.2d at 1318.
.
154. B. Fein & W.B. Reyno·lds, Drug Tests: No Harm to the Innocent, MANHATTAN
LAW., 1989, at 13.
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CONCLUSION

In its decision in United Food, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
decided against imposing stricter limitations on drug testing than
those set out by the Supreme Court in its decisions of Skinner and
Von Raab. The court of appeals created a special exception to the
reasonable suspicion requirement for drug testing of police and fire
fighters when conducted during the employee's regularly scheduled
physical examination. Citing strong public policy and the government's interest in protecting employees and the public, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland has determined that the right to privacy is
reduced when it seriously interferes with the safe management of
job-related duties. Thus, it appears that Maryland courts will have
little trouble upholding the constitutionality of most government drug
testing programs.

